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A significant amount of work time is lost each year due to worker absence, but evidence on the productivity
losses from absenteeism remains scant due to difficulties with identification.  In this paper, we use
uniquely detailed data on the timing, duration, and cause of absences among teachers to address many
of the potential biases from the endogeneity of worker absence.  Our analysis indicates that worker
absences have large negative impacts: the expected loss in daily productivity from employing a temporary
substitute is on par with replacing a regular worker of average productivity with one at the 10th–20th
percentile of productivity.  We also find daily productivity losses decline with the length of an absence
spell, consistent with managers engaging in costly search for more productive substitutes and temporary
workers learning on the job.  While illness is a major cause of absenteeism among teachers, we find
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  There is scant evidence on the productivity losses from worker absence, despite the fact 
that absenteeism results in an annual loss of two percent of work time in the U.S. (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2008).  Several highly regarded studies in economics have documented drops in 
productivity during labor disputes (Kleiner et al. (2002), Krueger and Mas (2004), and Mas 
(2008)), but labor disputes are rare—accounting for just one one-hundredth of a percent of lost 
work time—and it is unclear how these results generalize to more common sources of worker 
absence, such as illness or personal business.
1 
  In this paper, we present evidence on the impact of absenteeism on productivity using 
detailed panel data on the timing, duration, and causes of absences among teachers and the gains 
in academic achievement made by their students.
2  We take advantage of this data in several 
ways to address the endogeneity of absenteeism.  First, we base our identification on variation 
within teachers over time to avoid bias from the correlation of absenteeism with persistent 
differences in productivity across teachers.  Indeed, the richness of our data allows us to identify 
the impact of absences using variation within the same teacher, school, and grade level.  Second, 
we contrast estimates of the impact of absences that occur prior to student exams with those that 
occur afterwards; only the former can have a direct causal impact on our productivity measure.  
In these respects, our approach is similar to Mas and Moretti (2009); they evaluate peer effects 
among supermarket cashiers using variation in productivity within workers over time and 
                                                 
1 In addition, labor disputes involve more than just the replacement of full-time employees with temporary workers 
and are likely to have important effects on employee morale and effort.  For example, Krueger and Mas (2004), who 
study the production of Bridgestone/Firestone tires, find that defective tires were most likely to be produced during 
the period before a major strike (while regular workers were still on the job) and just before a new contract was 
settled (when striking employees worked alongside their replacements).  Statistics on the frequency of labor disputes 
can be found in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009). 
2 Economists have used student achievement data extensively to study productivity in teaching, with early studies by 
Hanushek (1971) and Murnane (1975) and recent work by Rockoff (2004), Rivkin et al. (2005), and Aaronson et al. 
(2007), among others.  There is some debate around how student sorting affects the measurement of teacher 
productivity (see Kane and Staiger (2008), Rothstein (2010)).  However, our identifying assumptions are much 
weaker than those needed to identify variation in quality between teachers, and we present direct evidence against 
our results being driven by student sorting. 2 
exploiting the fact that peers can only directly affect co-workers’ productivity after they arrive at 
work.  We also use a number of specifications and robustness checks to confirm that our findings 
are not driven by teachers taking more absences when they are assigned more difficult students, 
or by correlations between teacher absenteeism and student absenteeism or misbehavior.  
  Reductions in productivity associated with worker absence in teaching are statistically 
and economically significant.  These negative effects occur for absences prior to student exams 
but not afterwards, supporting a causal interpretation.  Our baseline estimates imply that the 
average difference in daily productivity between regular teachers and temporary substitutes is 
equivalent to replacing a teacher of average productivity with one at the 10
th percentile for math 
instruction or the 20
th percentile for English instruction.
3  We also find that productivity losses 
from absenteeism are greater for more experienced teachers, consistent with evidence from 
various studies that experienced teachers are more productive.  
  In addition, we provide evidence that daily losses in productivity from worker absence 
are decreasing in absence duration.  There are several reasons why this might be so. For 
example, managers may engage in costly search in order to hire more productive substitute 
workers for longer assignments, temporary workers may learn on the job, and the supply of more 
productive substitutes may be greater for longer job assignments.  Our estimates suggest that the 
daily productivity loss when a substitute is used for a single day is even greater than replacing an 
average teacher with one at the 1
st percentile in math and equivalent to replacing an average 
teacher with one at the 3
rd percentile in English.  In other words, extremely little production 
                                                 
3 Ours is not the first paper to estimate a negative impact of teacher absence on student achievement, but it is the 
first to examine variation in absence duration or cause, and the first to exploit the timing of absences relative to 
student exams. Miller et al. (2008) and Clotfelter et al. (2009) estimate the average effect of teacher absence on 
student achievement using a teacher fixed effects approach.  Duflo and Hanna (2005) document the negative impact 
of teacher absences on student achievement using a randomized control trial in rural India, where substitutes are not 
used to replace absent teachers. 3 
appears to take place when a teacher is absent for a single day, despite the presence of a paid 
temporary substitute.  In contrast, the average daily productivity loss from replacing regular 
teachers with “long-term” substitutes is equivalent to replacing a teacher of average productivity 
with one at the 19
th percentile in math and the 20
th percentile in English.   
  We also investigate variation in the effects of absences with different causes.  Indeed, one 
concern for our analysis is that shocks to worker health may lower productivity at work in 
addition to increasing absenteeism.  Despite a large literature on the impact of health on wages, 
earnings, labor force participation, and education (Currie and Madrian (1999), Smith (1999), 
Currie (2009)), there is little research on the impact of poor health on productivity at work—
what social psychologists have labeled “presenteeism.”
4  If worker health shocks directly affect 
productivity on the job, we might expect to see outsized impacts of absences that are related to 
serious health conditions.  However, we find that health and non-health related absences have 
very similar negative effects on productivity. 
  Last, but not least, we examine the importance of absence timing by focusing on the 
periods just prior to and during student examinations.  We find productivity losses for absences 
during periods well before exams, but larger impacts for absences in the weeks and days leading 
up to exams.  Furthermore, absences on the day(s) students are tested have impacts that are an 
order of magnitude greater.  This analysis indicates that the importance of labor productivity for 
specific output measures can vary considerably over the production cycle.  In the production of 
education, actions taken by teachers just prior to and during exams can have outsized effects on 
measured student achievement. 
                                                 
4 The literature in social psychology examines cross-sectional variation in self-reported measures of health and 
productivity (e.g., Goetzel et al. (2004), Pauly et al. (2008)).  In addition, some development economists have 
studied health and productivity of agricultural laborers (Strauss and Thomas (1998)).    4 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we provide a conceptual framework to 
motivate our empirical work.  In Section 3 we describe the data, and in Section 4 we present our 
main empirical estimates, robustness checks, and extensions. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
  We briefly present a conceptual framework that provides empirical predictions and 
highlights important issues for our analysis.  We consider the productivity of a representative 
worker on a specific day t as the sum of ability (r), work experience (Wrt), and a stochastic daily 
component (vrt) which equals zero in expectation and may be persistent over time (Equation 1). 
(1)      0 v E , v W g q rt rt rt r rt      
  Workers can choose to be absent, and will do so when the benefits (e.g., leisure) 
outweigh the costs (e.g., lower pay).  We model the net benefits of absence on day t for a regular 
worker (brt) as determined by a fixed worker-specific parameter (r) which captures persistent 
variation in the value of leisure, a function of the worker’s current salary (Yrt) and job 
characteristics (Crt) which capture variation in the financial costs of absence and the effort costs 
of working, and a stochastic daily component (rt) which equals zero in expectation but may be 
persistent over time (Equation 2): 
(2)      0 , ,     rt rt rt rt r rt E C Y h b     
  When a regular worker is absent, she is replaced with a substitute.  While the substitute’s 
labor productivity may depend on many factors, we focus on the length of work assignment, 
which we can observe.  Specifically, we posit that the expected average productivity of a 
substitute worker is increasing in the length of work assignment (Equation 3).   
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  There are several reasons to expect the productivity of a replacement worker to be greater 
when she is hired for a longer period of time.  First, managers may engage in costly search to 
find better workers for longer assignments, and may allocate the best available replacement 
workers to longer assignments.  In addition, the expected skill level of workers willing to take an 
assignment may be increasing in assignment length.  Last, but not least, if workers learn on the 
job, a replacement worker’s average productivity will rise with the length of her assignment.   
  Finally, we model production over a set of days indexed from 1 to T for a representative 
worker (and any substitutes that replaced her) as a function of daily labor productivity and other 
production inputs (X).  By assumption, production increases with labor productivity on any day. 
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  We derive several predictions from this simplified model.  If expected productivity is 
lower for substitute workers than the workers they replace, then increases in absenteeism should 
lower production, all else equal.  More formally, we can write: 
(5)  E[fT( jT * rt 1 j q ... q ,..., q ,X)] > E[fT( jT * st 1 j q ... q ,..., q ,X)] t* 
In addition, production losses from absenteeism will be greater for more productive workers (i.e., 
those with greater ability,  r  , or work experience, rt W ), all else equal.   
Finally, average daily production losses should be larger for short periods of absence than for 
longer spells, i.e., for any two spells of lengths M and N days, where M>N, the expected loss 
from the M day spell should be less than M/N times the loss from the N day spell.  Using the 
notation above, we can write this formally as: 
(6)  E[fT( jT k * t , r 1 * t , s * st 1 j q ,..., q ,..., q , q ,..., q   ,X)] > E[fT( jT k * t , s 1 * t , r * st 1 j q ,..., q ,..., q , q ,..., q   ,X)] t* 6 
  The model raises several issues for our empirical analysis.  Even if substitute workers 
were, in expectation, equally productive as the workers they replace, one might find a spurious 
relationship between absenteeism and production.  This could be generated by correlation 
between the worker’s value of leisure (r) and ability (r), both of which are typically 
unobservable.  For example, more able workers may also derive greater enjoyment from time 
spent at work.  To address this concern, one can compare production for the same worker across 
time, and examine how production varies with absenteeism. 
  A thornier empirical problem is that time-varying elements of productivity and the net 
benefits of absence may be correlated.  For example, changes in production inputs (X) will affect 
productivity and may also make a job less pleasant (i.e., affect Crt), causing workers to show up 
less often.  A similar problem would arise if workers experience persistent negative health 
shocks and are less productive on the job, in addition to taking more time off from work.  To 
address this issue, one could limit comparisons not only to the same worker over time but also to 
periods in which absences varied but other factors were held constant.  However, there may still 
be bias due to factors which cannot be directly observed.
5 
To gauge the importance of a number of sources of bias, one can use a placebo test based 
on the idea that a worker’s production over a given time period cannot be directly related to her 
future absences.  Taking any factor that lowers productivity, makes absenteeism more attractive, 
and is constant within workers over a set of days 1 to T, we can see that, conditional on the 
number of absences between day 1 and day T-K, the unobservable factor will create a correlation 
between productivity during days 1 to T-K and increase absences during days T-K+1 to T.  Thus, 
                                                 
5 One way to address the issue of unobservable factors is to use an instrumental variable for absenteeism.  In 
developing countries, economists have implemented field experiments which randomized introduction of financial 
bonuses for work attendance (Kremer and Chen (2001), Duflo and Hanna (2005)).  We lack such experimental 
variation.  We explore one potential instrumental variable (inclement weather and commuting distance) in Section 
4.1, but we find it has little power to predict absences in our setting.  We therefore rely on other empirical strategies. 7 
a relationship between current productivity and future absenteeism would be evidence of bias: 
we should observe no relationship between productivity measures and subsequent absenteeism if 
the link between productivity and absenteeism is causal.   
  Passing such a placebo test is, of course, not proof of causality.  Unobservable factors 
that are imperfectly correlated across the periods from day 1 to T-K and day T-K+1 to T will still 
hold the potential for bias.  While addressing all potential sources of bias in a non-experimental 
(or quasi-experimental) setting is quite difficult, one can assess the importance of many potential 
biases using detailed data.  For example, one issue is that temporary negative health shocks may 
cause workers to take more time off and be less productive on the job.  To test for this source of 
bias, one could compare the productivity effects of health-related absenteeism to the effects of 
absences for reasons such as personal business, vacation, or jury duty.   If the health bias exists, 
one would expect health related absences to appear more detrimental to productivity. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  Our data come from New York City, the largest school district in the U.S., and cover the 
school years 1999-2000 through 2008-2009.  We focus on teachers of math and English in 
grades 4 to 8, who can be linked to students for whom we generally have math and English test 
scores in both the current and previous year.  Students in elementary grades (4, 5, and some in 
grade 6) typically have the same teacher for both subjects, while older students are taught by two 
different teachers.
6  Over this period, the timing of exams ranged from early March to mid-May 
for math and from early January to mid-May for English (Appendix Table 1).  Exam periods 
                                                 
6 Students in grade 6 are taught by the same teacher in schools whose terminal grade is 6.  Student-teacher links 
were unavailable in some schools at the start of our sample, and we only include students in school-year cells for 
which we match greater than 75 percent of students with teachers.  Over this period, students with disabilities were 
typically taught in separate classrooms or schools and did not take the same standardized tests as general education 
students.  We therefore exclude all classrooms where the portion of special education students exceeded 25 percent.  
We also exclude a few classrooms with less than 7 or greater than 45 students, where the teacher switches schools 
during the year, or where the teacher was not on active duty for more than half the year or until after the exam. 8 
lasted from one to three days, followed by a five-day make-up exam period for students absent 
during all or part of the regular exam. 
  In addition to math and English test scores, we have information on students’ absences, 
suspensions, demographics, and receipt of free/reduced price lunch (a measure of poverty), 
special education for disabled students, and English Language Learner services.
7  Data on 
teachers’ demographics, graduate education, and experience were obtained from payroll records. 
  We have records of the date and reason given for all daily teacher absences over this time 
period. The rules governing teacher absences are set forth in a collectively bargained contract 
between the teachers union (the United Federation of Teachers) and the school district. Teachers 
earn ten days of paid absence per school year (one per month).  However, teachers accumulate 
unused absences, up to a cap of 200 days, and are paid 1/400
th of their most recent salary for 
each unused absence when they retire. Thus, using “paid” absences poses a real financial cost for 
teachers unless they are certain to reach the 200 day cap.
8 These rules allow teachers to use up to 
ten absences each school year for “Self Treated Sickness” – sick days which do not require proof 
of illness from a physician – or “Personal Days.” Teachers can take only three “Personal Days” 
each year, but there is no barrier to a teacher labeling an absence for personal business as “Self-
treated Sickness.”
9  Absences for “Medically Certified Sickness” (i.e., illness certified by a 
                                                 
7 We unfortunately lack daily information on student absences; we only know each student’s total absences for the 
school year.  Thus, we are unable to estimate a placebo test for whether students are affected by the absence of their 
regular teacher on days when they themselves do not show up at school.  We leave this line of inquiry to future 
work.  While we can test if teacher absences have smaller effects on students who themselves are absent more often, 
the correlation of student absenteeism with other characteristics would make the interpretation of such a test unclear. 
8 This constraint is unlikely to bind for the vast majority of teachers.  Among all teachers in New York (not just 
those teaching math and English in grades 4-8) hired in the school year 1999-2000, more than two thirds left 
teaching in the district by the end of our ten year sample, and only three percent of remaining teachers (1 percent of 
the cohort) used absences at a rate low enough to reach 200 in 25 years (i.e., 20 absences or less in over ten years). 
9 Support for this notion can be found in tabulations of absence by the day of the week.  As one might expect, the 
percentage of teachers absent for illnesses that are certified by a doctor is the same on Tuesdays through Thursdays 
(1.1%) as on Mondays and Fridays (1.1%).   In contrast, the percentage absent for Self-treated Sickness on Mondays 
and Fridays (2.9%) is greater than Tuesdays through Thursdays (2.0%); the percentage of teachers absent for 
Personal Days is also higher on Mondays and Fridays (0.3%) than on Tuesdays through Thursdays (0.2%).  9 
physician) and several other types of absences (Conferences/School Activities, Funeral/Death in 
Family, Jury Duty/Military Service, Injury, Graduation Attendance, Religious Holiday, and 
Grace Period) do not count towards the ten day cap.
10  A few absences are Unauthorized. 
  We also have data on the type, timing, and duration of extended work leaves and job 
separations, which we classify into 11 categories: Maternity Leave, Child Care Leave, Medical 
Leave, Sick Family Member Leave, Personal Leave, Sabbatical, Resignation or Retirement, 
Involuntary Termination, Certification Termination, Death, and Other (e.g., unauthorized leave, 
military deployment, and leave without pay for various reasons such as working in a charter 
school).
11  Rules governing extended leaves are also set forth in the union contract, in accordance 
with applicable laws such as the Family and Medical Leave Act.  Note that these events can 
impact students when they end as well as when they begin (e.g., women beginning their 
maternity leave in the summer may return several weeks or months after the school year starts).
12   
  Table 1 shows summary statistics on the frequency and duration of spells of absence, 
including extended leaves and job separations.  Duration is defined by the number of 
instructional days (i.e., work days) missed, not calendar days, though the two are highly 
correlated. On average, teachers miss an average of 10 days out of a 180 day school year, and in 
only three percent of cases did a teacher miss no instructional days during the year.  “Self-treated 
Sickness” accounts for a large portion of all days missed, more than four days per teacher per 
                                                 
10 “Grace period” typically applies to teachers who are absent prior to an extended leave (e.g., maternity). These 
teachers have exhausted their paid absences and are not paid, and grace period is capped at 30 days.  
11 Certification Termination refers to termination of teachers who lacked required credentials; these occur primarily 
just before the school year 2003-2004, when state requirements were strictly enforced after a legal battle between 
New York City and New York State.   
12 In about 10 percent of cases, leaves are consecutive (e.g., maternity leave can turn into child care leave), and we 
aggregate these into a single leave, using the initial leave to classify the sequence.  If daily absences are followed 
immediately by an extended leave (e.g., medical leaves are often preceded by absences for “Medically Certified 
Sickness”), we group these together and classify the spell by the extended leave of absence. In some cases, 
consecutive daily absences are not all labeled with the same code. In these instances, we label all absences in the 
spell under a single code, giving priority to more specific causes, in the following order: Injury, Medically Certified 
Sickness, Funeral/Death in Family, Jury Duty/Military Service, Religious Holiday, Graduation Attendance, 
Conferences/School Activities, Personal Day, Self-treated Sickness, Grace Period, and Unauthorized. 10 
year on average, while Medically Certified Sickness and Conferences/School Activities account 
for two days and one day, respectively, per teacher per year.  The extended leave that accounts 
for the most days missed is Medical Leave, which is taken by just over one percent of teachers 
per year but has an average duration of almost 43 instructional days.  Other types of extended 
leave are even less common but have similarly long durations (e.g., maternity leave is taken by 
0.5 percent of teachers and has an average duration of 48.6 days).
13 
    Before proceeding to our main analysis, we examine associations between absence 
frequency and the characteristics of students and teachers using negative binomial regressions.  
We find a marginally significant coefficient on students’ prior math test scores, suggesting that 
teacher absence—if costly to students—may contribute slightly to inequality in educational 
outcomes (Table 2a).  There is no significant relationship between work days missed and free 
lunch receipt (our measure of poverty), special education services, or English language learner 
services, but we find that teachers of Hispanic students miss fewer days, relative to teachers of 
white students.  Results from negative binomial regressions of work days missed on a set of 
teacher characteristics are shown in Table 2b.  Having a graduate degree is associated with fewer 
work days missed, as is having few years of teaching experience.  Younger female teachers miss 
more days of work relative to teachers of different gender and age categories, and black and 
Asian teachers miss fewer days relative to white teachers. 
  Unfortunately, we do not have data on the substitutes who replace regular teachers.  
Substitutes typically do not need to pass state certification requirements (i.e., possess a degree in 
education and pass a series of exams) but must have a bachelor’s degree.  If a substitute teacher 
                                                 
13 To better understand teachers’ potential control over the timing of extended leaves, we have examined the 
percentages of each type of event that begin or end during the middle of the school year.  Maternity and Medical 
Leaves—where we do not expect much control over timing—result in missed work days 90 and 93 percent of the 
time, respectively, while Personal and Other Leaves—where timing may be partially under teachers’ control—only 
result in missed work days 20 and 30 percent of the time, respectively. 11 
works for more than 40 days during the school year, they must have certification or complete 
additional certification coursework before the start of the following school year.  An important 
source of substitute teachers in New York City is the Absent Teacher Reserve, which consists of 
teachers who lost their jobs due to grade reconfiguration, reduction in student enrollment, 
programmatic change, or phase out or closing of their school.  These teachers have been unable 
to find another job, but, in accordance with the union contract, the school district pays their full 
salary and they work as substitute teachers, either on a per-diem or long-term basis. 
4. Regression Specifications and Empirical Estimates 
  We begin by estimating a regression specification of the following form: 
(7)  it gt it it it it it it S W Z X A Y                
where  it Y  is the exam score of student i in year t,  it A is the number of work day absences for the 
student’s teacher, Xit, Zit, and Wit are vectors of, respectively, student, class, and teacher 
characteristics, Sit is a vector of school-grade-year characteristics, and  gt   is a grade-year fixed 
effect.
14 Estimates from this specification suggest that an additional day of work missed by a 
regular teacher is associated with a decrease in student test scores of 0.0017 and 0.0006 standard 
deviations in math and English, respectively (Table 3, Columns 1 and 4).   
Our conceptual framework motivates the concern that teachers who frequently miss work 
also provide lower quality instruction while on the job.  We employ two strategies to address this 
issue.  First, we separate absences by their timing—before, during, or after student exams.  Since 
absences after exams cannot have a direct causal relationship with student exam performance, 
                                                 
14 Student characteristics include a cubic polynomial in prior year math and English scores, the number of absences 
and suspensions in the previous year, and indicators for gender, race and ethnicity, free/reduced price lunch, special 
education, and English Language Learner.  We also interact all of these variables with the student’s grade level.  
Teacher characteristics include indicators for the number of years of teaching experience (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7+), 
gender, race, and possession of a graduate degree.  School-grade-year and classroom characteristics include averages 
of student characteristics and class size. 12 
any observed relationship must be due to endogeneity.  When we allow the coefficient on work 
days missed to differ by their timing relative to student exams (Table 3, Columns 2 and 5), we 
find much larger negative effects prior to the exam than afterwards.
15  For math, the estimated 
coefficient on absences prior to the exam (-0.0020) is more than five times the coefficient for 
absences after the exam (-0.0003); the relative size of the estimates for English are similar (-
0.0008 before the exam, -0.0002 afterwards).  Nevertheless, absences after the exam are 
marginally significant, suggesting some bias in our estimates.   
We then include teacher-school-grade fixed effects. When we control for these time-
invariant dimensions of instructional quality (Table 3, Columns 3 and 6), the coefficients on 
absences prior to the exam become smaller (-0.0012 for math and -0.0006 for English) but 
remain highly significant, while estimates for absences after the exam  are now statistically 
insignificant in addition to being quite small (-0.0001 in both subjects).  These results are in line 
with a negative causal impact on productivity of replacing a regular teacher with a temporary 
substitute.  They also indicate that absences are negatively correlated with the time invariant 
dimensions of instructional quality captured by the teacher-school-grade fixed effects.
16 
  We test the robustness of these baseline estimates in several ways.  First, we drop prior 
test scores as control variables from our regression specification and replace students’ current 
test scores with their prior test scores as the dependent variable.  In other words, we test whether 
teachers are absent more often in years when they are assigned students with lower prior test 
scores.  Such a relationship would raise the concern that student sorting might bias our estimates 
of the impact of absences.  However, we find no significant relationship between absences prior 
                                                 
15 The coefficient estimates on absences during the regular exam and make-up exam periods are also negative and 
statistically significant.  We focus on these results in greater detail in Section 4.3.  
16 Indeed, most of this is due to variation across teachers—we find similar coefficients using only teacher fixed 
effects—suggesting that teachers who are more effective in the classroom also miss fewer days of work. 13 
the exam and students’ prior test scores (Table 4, Columns 1 and 2), in contrast to our baseline 
results (displayed again in Table 4, Columns 2 and 4).  Second, we take advantage of the fact 
that over 90 percent of middle school students in New York City take math and English with the 
same classmates, even though they have different teachers in each subject.  If student 
composition caused achievement to fall and teacher absences to rise, we might expect the 
absences of math teachers prior to the English exam to be correlated with English achievement, 
and vice versa.  In fact, if we omit teacher-school-grade fixed effects, there is indeed a significant 
coefficient (-0.0003) for the “effect” of English teachers’ absences prior to the math exam on 
math achievement (Table 5, Column 1).  However, once the fixed effects are included, this 
coefficient becomes much smaller (-0.0001) and insignificant (Table 5, Column 2).  Math 
teachers’ absences prior to the English exam bear no relation to English achievement, regardless 
of the omission or inclusion of fixed effects (Table 5, Columns 3 and 4).   
  In further support of the idea that we are estimating causal effects, we have also 
examined whether our estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of control variables for student 
absences and suspensions in the current school year.  Teacher illness could (causally) lead to 
student illness (and lower achievement), or vice versa, generating a spurious correlation of 
absences with achievement.  Students might also misbehave if they think their teacher will be 
going away on an extended leave.  However, including these control variables has no noticeable 
impact on our estimates, although students’ own absences and suspensions are both negatively 
related to their level of achievement.  These results are available upon request. 
  Having established a strong case for a causal effect of absences on productivity, it is 
helpful to consider the magnitude of these effects.  We present a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation to give a better sense of the magnitude of the daily productivity loss from having to 14 
replace an absent teacher with a temporary substitute.  To do so, we make the simplifying 
assumption that annual productivity differences across teachers—which are well documented by 
economists—are driven by a linear accumulation of differences in daily productivity.  This 
assumption allows us to estimate the average annual productivity difference between regular 
teachers and substitutes by summing the daily difference in productivity (-0.0012 standard 
deviations in math test scores) over the roughly 130 instructional days prior to the math exam. 
Doing so, we arrive at a reduction in math scores of -0.156 standard deviations.  We can then 
compare this effect to the impact of replacing a regular teacher of average productivity with one 
of lower productivity for the entire school year.  Given estimates in the literature, one would 
have to replace an average teacher with one at the 10
th percentile of the teacher productivity 
distribution to get a similar reduction in math scores.  In English, our estimated coefficient on 
absences (-0.0006 standard deviations) together with a pre-exam period of 110 instructional days 
suggest that replacing a regular teacher with a substitute is, on average, equivalent to replacing 
an average teacher with one at the 20
th percentile.
17  Thus, our analysis suggests that temporary 
replacements have drastically lower productivity than regular full-time teachers.
18 
4.1 Instrumental Variables 
  A more direct solution to the endogeneity problem would be to use an instrumental 
variables approach.  We explore this using the interaction of extreme winter weather with a 
                                                 
17 To reach this estimate, we take the results from a study by Kane et al. (2008) of teachers in New York City, 
though their estimates are similar to other studies in this literature (see Hanushek and Rivkin (2010)).  Kane et al. 
estimate that math test scores fall by -0.12 standard deviations for a one standard deviation decrease in teacher 
productivity. This implies that replacing an average teacher with one at the 10
th percentile (1.3 standard deviations 
below the mean) would reduce scores by -0.156 standard deviations.  Extrapolating our absence coefficient in 
English (-0.0006) over 110 days implies a reduction in test scores of -0.066 standard deviations.  Kane et al. (2008) 
find students’ English test scores fall by -0.08 standard deviations for a one standard deviation decrease in teacher 
productivity.  Given this estimate, to reduce scores by -0.066 standard deviations one would need to replace an 
average teacher with one at the 20
th percentile (0.82 standard deviations below the mean).   
18 Note that our results are not necessarily informative about what the productivity of individuals working as 
substitute teachers might be if they were employed full-time.  This is analogous to how studies of labor unrest do not 
tell us what the productivity of “scab” workers would be if they had the training and support of regular employees. 15 
teacher’s commuting distance as an instrument for teacher absence, an approach used previously 
in work by Miller et al. (2008).  We use weather data from the National Climactic Data Center at 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and measure teachers’ distance from 
school using the school’s address and the centroid of the zip code of the teacher’s residence. 
Unfortunately, the instrument does not have a statistically significant “first stage” in 
predicting teachers’ total absences prior to the exam.  We do find that living more than ten miles 
away from work has significant power to predict absences on days with extreme weather 
(Appendix Table 2, Columns 1 and 3), confirming that teachers who live far away are more 
likely to stay home on these days.
19  However, when we try to predict teachers’ total absences 
prior to exams, the point estimates on the interaction of the number of days with extreme weather 
and living ten or more miles from work are quite close to zero (Columns 2 and 4).  This suggests 
that teachers who have a long commute and miss work due to bad weather will “make up” that 
day some other time.  Equivalently, teachers who live close to work and show up in bad weather 
may “make up” for it by taking a day off later. 
4.2 Persistence and Heterogeneity 
  Our baseline estimates and robustness checks strongly support the notion that 
productivity in teaching is significantly lower on days when regular teachers are replaced with 
temporary substitutes.  We extend our analysis by exploring the persistence of these effects and 
whether they vary systemically across certain types of schools, students, and teachers. 
  Recent studies of teacher productivity have documented that teachers’ effects on current 
test scores are larger than their effects on scores one year later.  For example, Kane and Staiger 
(2008) and Jacob et al. (2008) find that impacts of teacher quality on test scores measured in the 
                                                 
19  Using a different cutoff (e.g., less than 5 miles or less than 15 miles) does not change these results. 16 
year after the student was assigned to a teacher are between 20 and 50 percent as large as effects 
in current year.  The issue of “fade-out” has been raised for other educational interventions, 
though it may be caused by differences in future resources or belie improvements in other 
outcomes (see Currie and Thomas (1995), Garces et al. (2002), Chetty et al. (2010)).
20   
  To study persistence, we examine the impact of work days missed on students’ test scores 
in the following school year, conditioning on the same set of controls we used to examine 
impacts on test scores in the current year.  Since we cannot look at future exam scores for 
students who move to grade 9 or leave the school district, we first show that our baseline results 
are similar when we drop students in grade 8 and those for whom we do not observe test scores 
the following year (Table 6, Columns 1 and 4).   
  When we replace the current year’s exam with the following year’s exam as the 
dependent variable, we find estimates of fade-out which are very much in line with previous 
studies.  The coefficient on work days missed prior to exams falls from -0.0011 to -0.0003 in 
math and from -0.0006 to -0.0003 in English (Table 6, Columns 2 and 5), and only the math 
coefficient remains significant at conventional levels.  Note, however, that if a student does 
poorly in the current year, it may trigger policies in the following year designed to remediate or 
improve their performance.  When we control for future policy outcomes (i.e., grade retention, 
special education, English language learner services, and assignment to a more experienced 
teacher), the coefficients grow slightly in magnitude and are statistically significant in both 
subjects (Table 6, Columns 3 and 6).   
  Our baseline estimates characterize the average effect of absences across all teachers with 
whom they occur.  However, it is reasonable to think that the impact of absences may be 
                                                 
20 Lang (2010) makes the point that rescaling of annual tests to have a mean of zero and standard deviation one 
could also lead to a perception that the effects of educational interventions fade out. 17 
heterogeneous.  In particular, productivity losses are likely to be greater for absences of highly 
productive teachers.  This is an empirical question, however, since highly productive teachers 
may also develop effective and easy-to-use lesson plans that help substitutes provide instruction.  
While we cannot observe productivity directly, we can observe experience, which has been 
strongly linked to productivity by several studies (Rockoff (2004), Rivkin et al. (2005), Kane et 
al. (2008)).  This research suggests that teachers improve significantly over the first few years of 
their career. We therefore estimate regressions that allow the impact of disruptions to differ by 
whether teachers had less than three years or three or more years of teaching experience.   
  We find evidence that absences by experienced teachers cause a greater reduction in 
student test scores than absences by inexperienced teachers (Table 7).  The estimated difference 
in the impact of absence across the two groups of teachers is highly statistically significant in 
math and marginally significant in English (p-value 0.14).  Although point estimates for the 
impact of absences on student achievement among inexperienced teachers are still negative, we 
can no longer reject that they are zero.  This provides further support to the notion that the losses 
associated with the use of substitute teachers are caused by their relatively low productivity.   
In addition to heterogeneity across teachers, the effect of absences may vary across 
schools and students.  Schools may differ in their abilities to find good substitutes, and some may 
provide substitutes with high quality instructional materials to help reduce the impact of teacher 
absence.  Additionally, Todd and Wolpin (2003) stress that students and parents may respond to 
lower instructional quality by shifting household resources towards education.  We do not have 
measures of how responsive schools and students are to changes in teacher productivity, but it is 
not unreasonable to think that high performing schools and high performing students may be 
better equipped to deal with these issues.  We therefore estimated regressions that allow the 18 
effect of work days missed to differ across (a) schools with average test scores below and above 
the citywide median and (b) students with prior test scores below and above the citywide median.  
In the latter case, since students will vary in prior achievement within classrooms, we also 
estimated specifications that included classroom fixed effects.  We find that the negative effects 
of work days missed are similar across these groups of schools and students in both math and 
English.  These results are available upon request. 
  
4.3 Absence Duration 
  As discussed in Section 2, several factors suggest that daily productivity losses may 
decline with the duration of a spell of worker absence.  This could be due to managers engaging 
in costly search for better long-term substitutes, the labor supply decisions of more highly 
productive substitute workers, or temporary workers learning on the job.  To test this hypothesis, 
we construct variables that allow us to estimate the daily productivity losses associated with 
absences of different durations. Specifically, let Sitd  denote the number of spells of absence of 
duration d for teacher i in school year t.  We can then define the number of work days missed 
during spells lasting d days as Aitd = dSitd.  For example, if a teacher has two five-day absence 
spells during the school year, then Sit5 would equal 2 and Ait5 would equal 10. 
  It is easy to show that the total number of work days missed over the school year (Ait) is 
the sum of the work days missed from spells of a particular duration over all possible durations:  
(9)   

    
d
1 j
itj d it 2 it 1 it it A A ... A A A  
By substituting Equation 9 into Equation 7, we can see that Equation 7 contains an implicit 
restriction that the daily productivity loss from worker absence is invariant to absence duration: 19 
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We now relax this constraint and allow coefficients on work days missed to vary across several 
categories of duration: 1 day, 2-3 days, 4-5 days, 6-10 days, 11-30 days, and 31 days or more.
21   
The results are in line with our hypothesis that daily productivity losses are smaller for 
longer duration absences (Table 8). In math, the coefficients decline steadily as we move from 
single day spells of absence (-0.0036) to spells lasting 31 days or more (-0.0008).  In English, the 
daily productivity loss from single day spells is again the largest in magnitude (-0.0017) and then 
drops off precipitously.  The coefficient estimates in English rise slightly as we move to the 
longest durations, but we cannot reject that daily productivity losses are the same for all spells of 
duration two days or longer. 
  The variation in magnitude between the estimates for single day absences and those with 
long durations is economically important.  Again we use our back-of-the-envelope calculation, 
based on a comparison with variation in productivity across regular teachers, to illustrate this 
point.  For absences lasting just a single day, our estimates suggest that the difference in daily 
productivity between substitutes and the regular teachers they replace is greater than the 
difference between the daily productivity of an average teacher and a teacher at the 1
st percentile 
in math, and on par with the difference in daily productivity between an average teacher and one 
at the 3
rd percentile in English.  Put differently, it appears that very little educational production 
takes place when a regular teacher misses a single day of work.  In contrast, the estimates for the 
longest spells imply a difference in daily productivity equivalent to replacing an average teacher 
                                                 
21 Here, we focus on absences prior to student exams; we do not find that absences after exams are related to student 
achievement, regardless of their duration.  In cases where a spell of absence begins but does not end prior to an 
exam, the work days missed prior to the exam are grouped according the duration of the entire spell. 20 
with one at the 19
th percentile for math and the 20
th percentile for English—still an important 
loss in productivity, but far less severe. 
4.4 Health and Productivity at Work 
  In our baseline analysis, we restricted the impact of work days missed to be invariant 
with respect to the reason for the teacher’s absence.  In many cases, we believe this restriction is 
probably correct and, under a strict causal interpretation, is probably warranted:  conditional on 
duration, the relative productivity of a substitute should be independent of whether the regular 
teacher is absent for, say, a funeral or a child’s illness.
22  However, teachers may have health 
conditions that cause them to be less productive on the job, in addition to any impact of health on 
absence from work.  This could potentially make health-related absences appear more 
detrimental to student achievement than non-health related absences; essentially, estimates of the 
impact of health-related absences could suffer from omitted variables bias. 
  To investigate this possibility, we separately examine absences by type, and ask whether 
absences that we are confident were due to health conditions—Medically Certified Sickness, 
Medical Leave, and Maternity Leave—have outsized effects relative to other absences.
23  We 
find no evidence that health related absences by teachers cause a greater loss in student 
achievement than other absences (see Table 9).  When we estimate separate coefficients on the 
number of days missed prior to student exams, we actually find smaller point estimates for 
health-related absences, particularly for math.  However, one problem with this specification is 
                                                 
22 Whether the likelihood of absence was known in advance is outside the scope of our analysis, but it is reasonable 
to believe that predictable absences might enable teachers or administrators to prepare and therefore be less costly.  
While we do not have information on predictability in most cases, we have compared the impact of maternity 
leaves—which are clearly known in advance—to medical leaves—which may be sudden.  We find very similar 
negative impacts of both types of leaves prior to exams and no significant impacts of either type after the exam, 
suggesting the negative impact of absenteeism in this setting does not derive solely from unpredictability. 
23 Absences for Self-treated Sickness may be related to health, but our results are not sensitive to including them in 
the non-health-related category or including them as a separate category all to themselves.  Our results are also 
insensitive to placing absences for maternity leave with the “other” category.  21 
that health related absences have longer durations, and our previous results suggest that this 
would cause them to appear less detrimental.  When we allow the coefficients for health and 
other absences to differ by duration, we find they both have very similar magnitudes, and in no 
case can we reject that they are the same.   
Thus, we find no evidence that teachers absent for serious health conditions are also less 
productive while at work.  While our test for a link between health and on-the-job productivity is 
admittedly indirect, it is important to recognize that much of the existing literature on this 
issue—very little of it by economists—relies on cross-sectional variation and self-reported health 
and productivity measures. 
4.5 Worker Absences and the Timing of Productivity Measurement 
  In the empirical results above, we focus on the significant negative impact of absences 
prior to student exams, and contrast them with small and insignificant estimates for absences 
after the exam period.  However, the specifications from which these estimates were taken also 
included controls for absences during the time when students were actually taking exams.  In 
Table 10, Columns 1 and 3, we redisplay the results from our baseline regressions, including the 
coefficients on the number of absences during the main exam period—which can last between 
one and three days—and the five-day make-up period which directly follows it.
24  In both math 
and English, absences during the main exam period have significant negative impacts on 
achievement (-0.0244 and -0.0128) that are an order of magnitude greater than the estimated 
impact of absences in the pre-exam period (-0.0012 and -0.0006).   
In math, the coefficient on absences during the make-up exam period is also negative and 
significant, but in English the coefficient is positive, insignificant, and quite close to zero 
                                                 
24 Teachers are absent for an average of 5.8% of the days before exams, 5.3% of the days after exams, 2.6% of the 
days during the exam, and 8.5% of the days during the make-up period.  Thus, there is some indication that teachers 
do not wish to be absent on the day of the exam and shift work absences in order to do so. 22 
(0.0003).  It is unclear why we find a large negative effect of make-up period absences or why 
the effect is present in math but not English.  We speculate that the result is driven from 
differences between the testing schedule information and the actual dates students were tested in 
math.  Over this period, New York City was permitted to test students within a short window 
(usually 3 to 5 days) set forth by the state.  If some math tests were administered after the 
originally scheduled date, then a much larger fraction of students may have been tested during 
what we classify as the make-up period.
25 
  The striking results on absences during the main exam period have several possible 
interpretations.  Teachers may improve student performance on the day of the exam through 
purposeful and permissible actions, such as reminding students of test-taking strategies or 
making sure that all students understand exam instructions.  Teachers might also take actions 
which are not permissible, such as overtly (or covertly) supplying students with correct answers.  
Instances of teacher cheating are well-documented (e.g., Jacob and Levitt (2003), New York 
Times (2010)), and it is reasonable to think that substitute teachers—who typically proctor 
exams in a teacher’s absence—would have little incentive to engage in this type of malfeasance.  
Could cheating explain our findings?  Jacob and Levitt (2003) estimate that roughly 5 percent of 
teachers cheat and that cheating increases scores by 0.5 standard deviations, on average. If we 
(generously) assume that the probability of absence during the exam is independent of a 
                                                 
25 The coefficient on absences in the make-up period for math (-0.0036) is roughly 15 percent as large as the 
coefficient on absences on the exam date, but it is unlikely that 15 percent of students take the make-up exam on the 
day their teacher is absent. Student absences average 10 per year, or roughly five percent of instructional days. 
However, it is possible that we have missed some instances where the test schedule changed during the course of the 
school year (e.g., because of weather).  For example, we discovered that during the school year 2008-2009, extreme 




math exams from March 3, 2009 to March 4, 2009 (New York Times, March 3, 2009).  23 
teacher’s intention to cheat, we could expect a coefficient of -0.025.
26  This is larger than our 
estimate for English (-0.0128) but quite close to our estimate for math (-0.0244).  
Another plausible explanation is that students perform worse on high-stakes tests when 
their regular teacher is absent because of increased anxiety or discomfort.  Fuchs and Fuchs 
(1986) conduct a meta-analysis of two dozen small-scale experimental studies on how student 
familiarity with the examiner affects exam performance; they find positive effect sizes on the 
order of 0.3 standard deviations.  There are also many studies demonstrating how anxiety in 
various forms can impact exam performance (e.g., Steele and Aronson (1995)).
27 
  In addition to the effect teachers have on student performance on the day of the test, it is 
often noted anecdotally that teachers engage in test preparation activities in the days and weeks 
prior to the exam.  For example, they might focus on the material and types of questions most 
likely to be on the exam.  We investigate this by allowing for different impacts of absences 
occurring 1-5 instructional days, 6-20 instructional days, and at least 21 instructional days prior 
to the exam.  Though all absences have negative effects, we find clear evidence that absences in 
the weeks and days leading up to exams have greater impacts on exam performance than those 
occurring earlier in the year (Table 10, Columns 2 and 4).  For math, the coefficient estimate for 
absences 21+ days prior is -0.0010, similar to our baseline, but for absences 6-20 days and 1-5 
days prior, the point estimates are, respectively, double (-0.0019) and nine times (-0.0085) as 
                                                 
26 Jacob and Levitt report that classrooms suspected of cheating show gains of roughly 10 additional standard score 
points on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills.  Though the population standard deviation in standard score points varies 
somewhat across grade levels and subject matter, it tends to be around 20 points. 
27 A third alternative is that a teacher’s absence at so crucial a moment in the school year is a signal about her 
productivity on the job.  To address this issue, we take advantage of the fact that the math and English exams are 
given at different times, and that elementary school teachers provide instruction in both subjects.  Thus, we can 
include a control for a student’s current score in the other subject, and ask whether students score relatively worse in 
math (or English) when a teacher is absent for the math (or English) exam.  Our initial findings are quite robust to 
this much more stringent test, suggesting that, whatever the interpretation, a teacher’s absence during high stakes 
exams has an important negative causal effect on exam performance. 24 
large.  Coefficients for English are similar, suggesting that actions taken by regular teachers just 
before exams are more important for exam performance than those taken earlier in the year.
28   
5. Conclusion 
  Worker absence is an important phenomenon across all countries, industries, and 
occupations.   Among OECD nations, absence frequency is noticeably higher in northern 
European countries with generous national sick leave policies (e.g., Barmby et al. (2002), 
Bergendorff (2003)).  Absenteeism is also a major concern in developing countries, particularly 
in the public sector where oversight may be very weak (Chaudhury et al. (2006)). 
Despite its ubiquity, there is a paucity of empirical work which convincingly estimates 
the causal impact of absenteeism on labor productivity.  The major hurdle in this line of research 
is addressing the endogeneity of work absence.  To do so, we take advantage of extremely 
detailed data on the absences of teachers in New York City public schools.   We present evidence 
that missed work days have an economically important negative impact on productivity in 
teaching.  To be confident that our estimates are causal, we focus on variation within teachers 
over time and contrast the significant effects of absences occurring prior to exams with the lack 
of any effect for absences occurring afterwards.  We find similar impacts of absences across 
different students and schools, but greater impacts for more experienced (and productive) 
teachers than for newly hired teachers. 
Our estimates of daily productivity losses are smaller for longer spells of absence.  This 
pattern is likely caused by several factors: managers searching for more productive substitutes on 
longer job assignments, more productive workers applying for longer job assignments, or 
substitute workers becoming more productive on the job.  We also find very large negative 
                                                 
28 Allowing for separate coefficients for absences close to the exam does dampen the estimated effects of absence 
during the exam period, but these coefficients (-0.0162 for math and -0.0081 for English) remain quite large and 
statistically significant. 25 
effects of work absences just prior to and during student examinations, suggesting that actions 
taken by the teacher at certain crucial moments in the school year have outsized impacts on 
student exam performance.  Finally, we find no evidence that teachers show up to work when 
they are too ill to be productive (i.e., “presenteeism”), though a direct test based on observations 
of health and productivity at work would better address this issue. 
Our study focuses on absenteeism in a significant part of the U.S. economy and one 
which plays a key role in fostering growth (e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992), Hanushek and Woessman 
(2008)).  However, it is natural to ask how the impact of absenteeism in education might 
generalize to other sectors of the economy.  While the best way to address this question is 
through empirical study, it is worth considering some features of the educational process that 
may or may not be shared by other industries.  First, workers may be less substitutable in skilled 
occupations such as teaching, where all workers have a college education.  Second, paid sick 
leave is less common in private firms than public schools (70 percent versus 90 percent of 
employees receive it), and private sector employees may be more likely to be ill (and 
unproductive) while on the job.
29  Third, the production schedule in education is somewhat 
inflexible (e.g., classes cannot be rescheduled) and therefore absenteeism cannot be addressed 
through common methods such as overtime (Ehrenberg (1970)) or flexible work hours.   
  If worker absenteeism has important negative effects on production, what can be done to 
limit these losses?  One possibility is to address the root cause of absences, such as negative 
shocks to worker health.  Indeed, absence prevention is one of the main drivers of recent growth 
                                                 
29 One problem with these statistics, taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits Survey, is that the 
presence of paid sick leave may not accurately reflect the financial incentives for work attendance.  As we note 
above, teachers in New York City get paid when they are absent, but face financial costs because they are paid for 
unused absences upon retirement. 26 
in employer sponsored “health promotion” programs (Linnan et al. (2008)), though the evidence 
on the impact of these programs on absenteeism is quite mixed (Aldana and Pronk (2001)).    
Alternatively, governments and firms could offer stronger incentives for workers to show 
up.  Empirical evidence strongly suggests that financial incentives affect worker absence (e.g., 
Winkler (1980), Jacobson (1989), Ehrenberg et al. (1991), Barmby et al. (1991), Brown and 
Sessions (1996), and Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2000)).  However, only one study, a field 
experiment in rural India (Duflo and Hanna (2005)), presents clear evidence that incentives for 
workers to show up can raise productivity.  Financial incentives for work attendance could, in 
principle, decrease productivity by inducing workers to show up while seriously ill.  Though it is 
reasonable to think that workers would be less responsive to financial incentives when in poor 
health, this is ultimately an empirical question. 
 27 
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Total of All Types 9.98 1.56 96.9% 622,843
Self-Treated Sickness 4.23 1.12 90.6% 370,207
Medically Certified Sickness 2.02 2.39 41.2% 82,482
Conference/School Activities 1.12 1.30 32.8% 84,331
Medical Leave 0.54 42.78 1.3% 1,241
Personal Days 0.47 1.32 26.3% 34,476
Funeral/Death in Family 0.33 2.24 12.9% 14,212
Jury Duty/Military Service 0.26 2.07 9.8% 12,334
Maternity Leave 0.25 48.63 0.5% 506
Child Care Leave 0.13 47.95 0.3% 274
Injury 0.11 3.82 2.4% 2,910
Resignation or Retirement 0.11 42.56 0.3% 249
Religious Holiday 0.10 1.17 8.0% 8,226
Graduation 0.10 1.36 4.0% 7,217
Other Leave 0.06 44.82 0.1% 134
Legislative Hearing 0.04 1.32 1.4% 2,595
Grace Period 0.02 11.79 0.2% 161
Personal Leave 0.02 25.56 0.1% 75
Sick Family Member Leave 0.02 31.38 0.1% 77
Death 0.01 37.67 0.0% 15
Termination, Certification 0.01 34.15 0.0% 33
Involuntary Termination 0.01 40.75 0.0% 12
Unauthorized 0.01 1.55 0.4% 741
Late More than Half Day 0.00 1.01 0.3% 335
Note: Based on teachers in New York City teaching math and/or English to students in grades 4-8 during 
the school years 1999-2000 to 2008-2009.  Additional information on sample restrictions is provided in 
the text.Table 2a: Absence from Work and Students' Characteristics
Work Days 
Missed
Average Prior Math Test Score 0.9819+
(-1.9548)
Percent English Language Learner 0.971
(-1.3235)
Percent Receiving Free Lunch 0.9625
(-1.4126)








Note: This table presents coefficients from negative binomial 
regressions, transformed into odds ratios.  Dotted-lines separate 
the results of different regressions within each column.  All 
regressions have 97,540 teacher-year observations.  Robust t-





Experience (Relative to Teachers with 7+ Years)
   No Experience 0.7251*
(-20.7370)
   1 Year of Experience 0.8769*
(-9.0892)
   2 Years of Experience 0.9275*
(-5.2895)
   3 Years of Experience 0.9686*
(-2.2772)
   4 Years of Experience 0.9952
(-0.3369)
   5 Years of Experience 1.0018
(0.1201)
   6 Years of Experience 1.0015
(0.1032)
Males' Age (Relative to Younger than 30)
   Between 30 and 44 Years Old 0.9948
(-0.2768)
   Between 45 and 54 Years Old 0.9626
(-1.4610)




Females' Age (Relative to Younger than 30)
   Female Between 30 and 44 Years Old 1.1330*
(6.2312)
   Female Between 45 and 54 Years Old 0.9511+
(-1.9367)
   Female Over 55 Years Old 0.9332*
(-2.2193)
Ethnicity (Relative to White)
   Asian 0.9358*
(-2.8316)
   Black 0.9624*
(-3.1145)
   Hispanic 1.0085
(0.6439)
Note: This table presents coefficients from negative binomial 
regressions, transformed into odds ratios.  All regressions have 
97,540 teacher-year observations.  Robust t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.Table 3: Workday Absences and Productivity, Baseline Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Absences -0.0017* -0.0006*
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Absences Prior to Exam -0.0020* -0.0012* -0.0008* -0.0006*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Absences After Exam -0.0003+ -0.0001 -0.0002+ -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Teacher-School-Grade Fixed Effects √ √
R-squared 0.664 0.664 0.702 0.611 0.611 0.636
Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619 2,363,619
English Exam Math Exam
Note: All specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom 
characteristics, and grade-year fixed effects.  Specifications separating absences prior to and after exams also control for 
absences during the exam and make-up exam period.  Specifications without teacher-school-grade fixed effects also 
control for time-invariant teacher characteristics.  For more information, see the text.  Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered by school.  + significant at 10% * significant at 5% Table 4: Absences and Prior Test Scores
Year t-1 Year t Year t-1 Year t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absences Prior to Exam -0.0002 -0.0012* -0.0001 -0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Absences After Exam -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Control for Prior Test Scores √ √
R-squared 0.454 0.702 0.428 0.636
Number of Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619
Note: All specifications control for student characteristics (except prior math and 
English scores), teacher exerience, school-grade characteristics, classroom 
characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade fixed effects, and 
absences during the exam and make-up exam period.  For more information, see the 
text.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school +significant at 10% 
*significant at 5%
English Exam Math ExamTable 5: Absences of "Other Subject" Teachers in Middle School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Teacher's Absences Prior to Exam -0.0019* -0.0012* -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
English Teacher's Absences Prior to Exam -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Math Teacher-School-Grade Fixed Effects √
English Teacher-School-Grade Fixed Effects √
R-squared 0.692 0.717 0.625 0.642
Number of Observations 1,199,002 1,199,002 1,095,078 1,095,078
English Exam Math Exam
Note: All specifications are limited to students with different teachers for math and English. Regressions include 
controls for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom characteristics, 
grade-year fixed effects, and absences during the exam and make-up exam periods and after the exam.  
Specifications without teacher-school-grade fixed effects also control for time-invariant teacher characteristics.  
For more information, see the text.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.  + significant at 10% 
* significant at 5% Table 6: Persistent Effects of Workday Absences
Year t Year t+1 Year t+1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Absences Prior to Exam (Year t) -0.0011* -0.0003* -0.0004* -0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0003+
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Number of Absences After Exam (Year t) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Current Teacher-School-Grade Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √
Student/Teacher Characteristics in Year t+1  √ √
R-squared 0.699 0.653 0.655 0.644 0.594 0.596
Number of Observations 1,713,561 1,713,561 1,713,561 1,625,038 1,625,038 1,625,038
Math Exam English Exam
Note: Specifications are limited to students who are not in the 8th grade and who have valid test scores in the following year.  All 
specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year 
fixed effects, and absences during the exam and make-up exam period.   Controls for next year's characteristics include whether the 
student is repeating the grade or  receives special education or English Language Learner services in the following year, and controls 
for the experience level of  next year's teacher. For more information, see the text.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
school.  + significant at 10% * significant at 5% Table 7: Worker Absence, Productivity, and Worker Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Absences Prior to Exam -0.0012* -0.0013* -0.0006* -0.0007*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Teacher w/ Fewer than 3 Years Experience * 0.0007* 0.0005
     Number of Absences Prior to Exam (0.0003) (0.0003)
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.636 0.636
Number of Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619
Note: All specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade 
characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade fixed effects, 
and absences during the exam and make-up exam period.  For more information, see the text.  Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school +significant at 10% *significant at 5%
Math Exam English ExamTable 8: Absence Duration (in Workdays) and Productivity Loss
Math Exam English Exam
(1) (2)
Absences Prior to Exam, 1 Day Spells -0.0036* -0.0017*
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Absences Prior to Exam, 2-3 Day Spells -0.0029* -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Absences Prior to Exam, 4-5 Day Spells -0.0022* -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Absences Prior to Exam, 6-10 Day Spells -0.0017* -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Absences Prior to Exam, 11-30 Day Spells -0.0008* -0.0008*
(0.0003) (0.0004)




Note: All specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade 
characteristics, classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade 
fixed effects, and teacher absences during the exam and make-up exam period.  For more 
information, see the text.  Absence spells are categorized by the number of consecutive 
workdays missed (i.e., weekends, holidays, etc. are not counted). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered by school.  + significant at 10% * significant at 5% Table 9: Health vs. Non-Health Related Absences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Related Absences Prior to Exam -0.0009* -0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Non-Health Related Absences Prior to Exam -0.0019* -0.0007*
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Absences Prior to Exam in 1 Day Spells
     Health Related -0.0044* -0.0025+
(0.0012) (0.0014)
     Non-Health Related -0.0035* -0.0017*
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Absences Prior to Exam in 2-3 Day Spells
     Health Related -0.0025* -0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0010)
     Non-Health Related -0.0031* -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Absences Prior to Exam in 4-5 Day Spells
     Health Related -0.0029* -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0010)
     Non-Health Related -0.0015+ -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Absences Prior to Exam in 6-10 Day Spells
     Health Related -0.0016* 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0008)
     Non-Health Related -0.0018* -0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Absences Prior to Exam in 11-30 Day Spells
     Health Related -0.0006+ -0.0007+
(0.0003) (0.0004)
     Non-Health Related -0.0013+ -0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Absences Prior to Exam in 31+ Day Spells
     Health Related -0.0008* -0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0002)
     Non-Health Related -0.0011* -0.0005+
(0.0004) (0.0003)
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.636 0.636
Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2,363,619
Math Exam English Exam
Note: All specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, 
classroom characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade fixed effects, and teacher absences during 
the exam and make-up exam period.  For more information, see the text.  Absence spells are categorized by the 
number of consecutive workdays missed (i.e., weekends, holidays, etc. are not counted). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered by school.  + significant at 10% * significant at 5% Table 10: Absences and the Timing of Student Exams
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absences Prior to Exam -0.0012* -0.0006*
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Absences 21+ Workdays Prior to Exam -0.0010* -0.0003+
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Absences 6-20 Workdays Prior to Exam -0.0019* -0.0021*
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Absences 1-5 Workdays Prior to Exam -0.0085* -0.0040*
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Absences During Exam Period -0.0244* -0.0165* -0.0128* -0.0085*
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0033)
Absences During Make-up Exam Period -0.0036* -0.0027* 0.0003 0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Absences After Exam -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
R-squared 0.702 0.702 0.636 0.636
Observations 2,471,668 2,471,668 2,363,619 2363619
Note: All specifications control for student characteristics, classroom characteristics, school-grade characteristics, 
teacher experience, grade-year fixed effects, and teacher-school-grade fixed effects.  Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered by school.  + significant at 10% * significant at 5% 
Math Exam English ExamSchool Year Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
1999-2000 2/1-2/3/2000 4/12/2000 4/12/2000 4/12/2000 5/16-5/17/2000
2000-2001 1/29-2/2/2001 4/19/2001 4/19/2001 4/19/2001 5/8-5/9/2001
2001-2002 1/29-1/31/2002 4/16/2002 4/16/2002 4/16/2002 3/5-3/6/2002
2002-2003 2/4-2/6/2003 4/15/2003 4/15/2003 4/15/2003 1/14-1/15/2003
2003-2004 2/3-2/5/2004 4/20/2004 4/20/2004 4/20/2004 1/13-1/14/2004
2004-2005 2/1-2/3/2005 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 4/12/2005 1/11-1/13/2005
2005-2006 1/10-1/12/2006 1/17-1/18/2006 1/17-1/19/2006 1/17-1/18/2006 1/17-1/18/2006
2006-2007 1/9-1/11/2007 1/16-1/17/2007 1/16-1/18/2007 1/16-1/17/2007 1/16-1/17/2007
2007-2008 1/8-1/10/2008 1/8-1/9/2008 1/15-1/17/2008 1/15-1/16/2008 1/15-1/16/2008
2008-2009 1/13-1/15/2009 1/13-1/14/2009 1/21-1/23/2009 1/21-1/22/2009 1/21-1/22/2009
School Year Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
1999-2000 5/17-5/19/2000 5/4/2000 5/4/2000 5/4/2000 5/18-5/19/2000
2000-2001 5/6-5/8/2001 4/25/2001 4/25/2001 4/25/2001 5/15-5/16/2001
2001-2002 5/7-5/9/2002 4/23/2002 4/23/2002 4/23/2002 5/7-5/8/2002
2002-2003 5/6-5/8/2003 4/30/2003 4/30/2003 4/30/2003 5/6-5/7/2003
2003-2004 5/4-5/6/2004 4/27/2004 4/27/2004 4/27/2004 5/4-5/5/2004
2004-2005 5/10-5/12/2005 4/19/2005 4/19/2005 4/19/2005 5/10-5/11/2005
2005-2006 3/7-3/9/2006 3/7-3/8/2006 3/14-3/15/2006 3/14-3/15/2006 3/14-3/15/2006
2006-2007 3/6-3/8/2007 3/6-3/7/2007 3/13-3/14/2007 3/13-3/14/2007 3/13-3/14/2007
2007-2008 3/4-3/6/2008 3/4-3/5/2008 3/10-3/11/2008 3/10-3/11/2008 3/10-3/11/2008
2008-2009 3/4-3/6/2009 3/4-3/5/2009 3/10-3/11/2009 3/10-3/11/2009 3/10-3/11/2009
English Exams
Math Exams
Appendix Table 1: New York City Math and English Testing Dates, 2000-2009Appendix Table 2: First Stage Estimates for Weather-Commuting Instrumental Variable
Winter Weather 
Days Only All Days
Winter Weather 
Days Only All Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Teacher Lives 10+ Miles from School * 0.0827* -0.0041 0.1017* 0.0283
   Winter Weather Days Prior to Exam (0.0064) (0.0963) (0.0072) (0.0984)
R-squared 0.549 0.597 0.581 0.615
Observations 2,412,720 2,412,720 2,301,352 2,301,352
Absences Prior to Math Exam Absences Prior to English Exam
Note: Distance is measured from the centroid of the zipcode of residence to the school.  Winter weather days include exteme 
weather events for Winter Storm, Extreme Cold/Wind Chill, and Heavy Snow (as classified by NOAA). See text for more 
information. All specifications control for student characteristics, teacher experience, school-grade characteristics, classroom 
characteristics, grade-year fixed effects, teacher-school-grade fixed effects, and teacher absences during and after the exam and 
make-up exam period.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school.  * significant at 5% 